



Freud, Bentham: Panopticism and the Super-Ego

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I

It is not often that the names Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, and Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, are heard in conjunction in scholarly debate. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there is a significant convergence between these two thinkers when it comes to their respective notions of the Panopticon and the Super-ego. In what follows we will demonstrate this convergence.

We will first give an account of both thinkers' "theories of man." Once this has been done it will be possible to discern recurrent key themes in the theories of both thinkers. We will then proceed to a discussion of the role of the "super-ego" in Freud's theory of man. By so doing, it will emerge that Freud's conception of the super-ego has a historical cousin. This is Bentham's Panopticon.

II

Freud's aim in his work was to develop what Marcuse has called a "psychology" that is an account of the human in philosophical terms. In doing so he self-consciously attempted to place himself within the tradition of Western philosophy.

On Fromm's reading, Freud was heir to the philosophical tradition of humanism and enlightenment¹.

Freud begins his theory with a key assumption. This is the notion of the existence of "man" *as such*, that is, that there is a "universal human nature." He thought that there was a definite psychological structure of "man" which could be discerned and would constitute a "key to human destiny."² Like the philosophers of the Enlightenment Freud built a theory of universal human nature on the basis of which all "fundamental aspects" of "man" could be analysed, understood and explained. Crucially for Freud these explanations would include the explanation of *neuroses*.

Throughout his thought Freud saw "man" as a closed system. In his early theory this closed system was driven by two fundamental forces: the self-preservative and sexual drives. As Marcuse has shown, this theory characterises the mental apparatus as a "dynamic union of opposites"³ between conscious and unconscious "structures." This dualistic conception of drives / instincts permeates Freud's thought throughout. Later, when he introduces the tripartite metapsychology of *id, ego and super-ego* the forces of the early theory have been replaced by the conflict between *Eros* (the life instincts) and *the death instinct*, which is considered the basis for human destructiveness. As Fromm notes, the dualism of Eros and the death instinct are "inherent in all living substance and operate without any particular stimulation" (Fromm, p. 51). For Freud the "eternal struggle" between these forces constitutes the problematic of the human condition. It is the later phase of Freud's thought which will be our focus.

Although his "new theory" constitutes a decisive change in Freud's thought it should not be construed that he completely revised his position. Freud's assumption that the aim of the "psychic mechanism" consists in the "lessening of psychic tension" was a constant in his thought. Freud constructs a broadly *economic* model of the psyche in which there is an "exchange" of psychical tensions toward an optimum level. For example, Freud considered that the sexual drives were rooted in the broadly bio-chemical/physiological processes of the brain. These operated in definite

¹ See Fromm, E. *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*, p. 46.

² See Schorske, C.E. "Freud: The psychoarcheology of civilizations," in, *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, p. 17/18.

³ Marcuse, p. 35.

“phased” patterns. In the first phase tension and hence un-pleasure were built up. The second phase would then reduce this tension. The result would be the creation of the subjective sensations of pleasure. This general approach is retained in the later theory. Eros and the death instinct are now placed in this relation of opposition.

Eros and the death instinct are opposites. Whereas Eros has the tendency to “unite and integrate,” the death instinct has the tendency to “disintegration and destruction.” Both of these drives are constantly operative in “man” at an unconscious level. They battle with each other until the time when the death instinct establishes itself as the stronger and has its victory with the death of the individual human subject. Thus the death instinct (destructiveness) is the eternal rival and, in every particular case, victor over Eros (the sexual and self-preservative drives). Man is determined to want to destroy as the death instinct is rooted in his biological nature. Although this destructive drive can be controlled to a degree it can never be vanquished of its power. Individuals’ only alternatives are to either turn this destructiveness toward themselves or toward the external world. As Fromm so eloquently puts it, humanity “. . . has no chance of liberating . . . [itself] . . . from this tragic dilemma” (Fromm, p. 51/52).

Turning away from Freud for now, we can consider Bentham. By the time Bentham was writing it became possible for him to state without argument on the first line of the first page of his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1781) that:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. (Bentham, *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 1)

Bentham held that all human action, be it social or political, could be analysed and understood in these terms. For Bentham people actually do behave in accordance with these principles; that is, they seek pleasure and seek to avoid pain. This dualistic principle also had the character of an imperative for Bentham in that humanity *ought* to act in accordance with these principles. In essence Bentham thought that humanity should seek to maximise utility, which is equivalent to producing the “greatest happiness for the greatest number.” This was, for Bentham, equivalent to “maximising pleasure and minimizing pain.”

We should note that there is a significant difference between Freud's theory and Bentham's theory. Essentially, Bentham's theory is rationalistic in the sense that he thought that individuals were capable of performing conscious consequentialist calculations when deliberating about action and choose the course of action that would result in maximum pleasure. In this sense individuals can be conscious of their drives. By contrast, for Freud it is entirely possible that individuals never become conscious of the forces driving them and can thus, and often do, act irrationally. It is this conscious / unconscious, rational / irrational dimension of Freud's thought that sets him apart decisively from Bentham.

It is possible to discern certain key themes in our discussion so far. These are: *dualism, determinism, reductionism* and *epiphenomenalism*. I will deal with each.

The claim that both thinkers expressed a dualistic conception of drives should be obvious. In Freud's later theory these drives were Eros and the death instinct whereas for Bentham, throughout, these drives were pleasure and pain. Theories of man (and mind) founded on the dualistic principle of two fundamentally opposing "forces," have enjoyed a popularity in the history of philosophy. With his model of man Freud shows himself to be very much in that tradition, which is here exemplified by Bentham. An individual's action can be understood as resulting from and, at least in part, reducible to these forces.

This gives us insight into Freud's determinism. This consisted in the view that human behaviour is a product of these dualistic forces. In other words, unconscious mentality determines conscious mentality. Man is trapped; he cannot escape these determining forces which underlie his actions. We can see here the parallel with Bentham for his determinism consisted in the view that humanity cannot act except in accordance with pleasure and pain.

From what has been said it should prove to be no surprise that Freud's reductionism consisted in reducing the causes of actions of any individual to underlying desires / instincts and thus to unconscious mentality. Again the parallel with Bentham is striking for his reductionism consisted in the fact that individual's actions could be reduced to the underlying drives of pleasure and pain.

Freud's epiphenomenalism consisted in the fact that human feelings such as love and tenderness are regarded as sensations that result from (and accompany) the agent's libidinous interests (see Fromm, p. 47). Such feelings are not the primary

determinant in human action and they alone cannot counteract the underlying causal potency of the drives / instincts that they accompany. Again there is the parallel with Bentham in that, given his theory of pleasure and pain, his epiphenomenalism consists in the fact that what Mill would later call “higher pleasures,” such as literary and philosophical interests, would be viewed more crudely by Bentham as pleasures to be enjoyed but resulting from a hedonistic calculation and such a calculation would ultimately be driven by *fundamental* drives, the core seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain.

Freud, then, was by no means an isolated thinker. Although original and inventive his thought was very much in line with the tradition of Western philosophy. Given this, the claim that there is a philosophical convergence between Freud and Bentham should seem less anomalous. Both thinkers shared in the view that man was driven by two fundamental forces, both were reductionist, both were deterministic and epiphenomenalist. There is, however, a far more striking parallel between Freud and Bentham, which does not just consist in the above factors. Indeed, such a parallel has been noted elsewhere in the scholarly literature.⁴ This parallel consists between Freud’s concept of the super-ego and Bentham’s prison, the Panopticon.

III

Our claim is this: that the structure and function of the super-ego is mirrored by the structure and function of the Panopticon. This mirroring relation, in turn, is founded upon Freud’s and Bentham’s views of the nature of humanity. Although separated by the rationalism / irrationalism gulf, these two thinkers exhibit some points of contact in their thought. Our claim is not that Freud and Bentham held theories of man that are identical in content, for they did not; rather, our claim is that they shared a *structurally* similar view of the nature of humanity, as was outlined above. On the basis of this parallel they constructed parallel views of the nature of disciplinary or corrective structures that were, respectively, “at work” in the human animal or could be “put to work.”

⁴ Freud’s “. . . theory of instincts, with its duality . . . resonates with echoes of Bentham’s hedonistic system” (Schorske, “Freud: The psychoarcheology of civilizations,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, p. 12).

In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), Freud asserts that the human mind has developed over the course of history and that central to this development has been the idea that coercive forces that are external to the agent are gradually internalised (see Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 190). On Freud's account it is the super-ego that is instrumental in this. According to Freud, the super-ego appropriates the imperatives of external coercion and integrates them into its functioning, the result being that they are deployed internally (see *ibid*, p. 190). The super-ego is a mental agency specifically concerned with the internalisation of external coercion.

Concepts like super-ego, "conscience," "sense of guilt," "need for punishment" and "remorse" for Freud are all aspects of the super-ego's functioning:

The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the super-ego. (Freud, p329)

The super-ego is therefore a voyeuristic mental agency. It keeps watch over the ego and keeps it in check.

For Freud it is not even proper to treat of the phenomenon of conscience until the super-ego is present in the historical human. When characterising the super-ego Freud introduces some key notions. He says:

the distinction, moreover, between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, since nothing can be hidden from the super-ego, not even thoughts. (Freud, p. 317)

The super-ego is omniscient. With its pervasive eye the distinction between acts and intentions is blurred. With the super-ego in place an individual will feel guilty for ill acts merely intended but never carried out.

[O]wing to the omniscience of the super-ego, the difference between an aggression intended and an aggression carried out lost its force.

Henceforward a sense of guilt could be produced not only by an act of violence that is actually carried out (as all the world knows), but also by one that is merely intended (as psychoanalysis has discovered). (Freud, p. 330/331)

This claim to discovery here on Freud's part is particularly interesting in light of our project. This is so since we will show that this is not strictly speaking a discovery of psychoanalysis but rather the psychoanalytic version of an already formulated idea. The super-ego has no motive for mistreating the ego yet it maintains an independent, impartial critical eye upon the ego. The super-ego is an omniscient, voyeuristic mental agency that operates with an air of independence and impartiality in criticising, judging and commanding the ego. It is imperative to the super-ego's causal role, its commandments *cause* the human subject to act in accordance with it. In his reading of Freud in this connection Fromm suggests that here the key word that should be in mind is "control" (Fromm, [2], p. 7).

It is not actually the specific "content" of the super-ego that makes it what it is, namely the *agent* of morality. Instead, it is the super-ego's relations to other agents and to the ego itself that make it what it is. And as Church has pointed out, to give an account of the nature and formation of the super-ego is at once to account for the nature and formation of morality itself (see Church, p. 209).

Any external agent that is influential on the agent may be internalised on the Freudian account. Freud has offered us the "mechanism" of the mind by which such an agency is created. Mechanisms are content neutral in the sense that, as with the mechanisms of a computer that operate in the same way regardless of the content of the files they operate with, they are merely the process by which something happens. To this extent there is a certain contingency of content with regards to the super-ego. Individuals who endure in different overarching social and moral structures will internalise and generate different codes of morality and different behaviours.

For any individual, "recognising" their super-ego involves becoming conscious of its function *qua* overseer of the ego. Individuals are conscious of the presence of their super-ego but do not identify themselves with it. The super-ego retains in its internalisation its otherness and the behaviour of the agent, on this

account, will be modified in so far as the internalised other remains conceived as external. The super-ego is the internal “voice” that issues imperatives as well as an inner “eye” that detects “bad behaviour.” This inner voice has influence even as an individual deliberates about courses of action. It has power over individuals’ intentions to act. As a causal inner voice the super-ego watches over my conscious desires before they are articulated in action.

In its role as inner voice the distinction between an act intended and an act carried out loses its force. The super-ego criticises the ego in its essence; it is the agency of normalization and control; it speaks for the overarching morality that has been internalised. The aim is control: the super-ego seeks to normalize not just the behaviour of the subject, but the very intentions of the subject and thereby normalize the individual.

Another dimension to Freud’s thought is his notion of the “ego-ideal.” The ego-ideal comes about from the fact that we often admire those who oversee us, parents for example. The super-ego and ego-ideal are related aspects of a single phenomenon for Freud. The ego-ideal has an important part to play in the psyche since it is in response to the super-ego taken as ideal that the ego longs to improve whereas it is in the super-ego taken as judge that it suffers the anxiety and anticipation of its failure. The result is a dialectic of confusion in the individual psyche, the oscillation between the extremes of longing to improve and anticipated failure are unsettling. Small wonder, then, that Freud saw such mechanisms of the psyche as leading to neurosis. He did, however, regardless of the harm that such agencies and mechanisms cause, retain the notion that the existence of the super-ego and ego-ideal were necessary to the existence of morality and ultimately of civilization but he did believe that a “weakening” of the two were, in general, desirable.

The presence of the super-ego qua critic and ideal were considered by Freud to be identical to the presence of the moral sense. Although the super-ego is initially based on particular individuals it eventually becomes abstract and becomes the representative of general social authorities and ideals. And by this internalisation the individual has had instilled in them the external morality. Ideally their behaviour will, as a result of this, fall in line with what is expected of them by the morality of the society. They will be normalized.

It seems, then, that it is by the existence and power of the super-ego that individuals become capable of acting, not in the service of their self-interest, but out of service for something “over and above” their self-interest even when external coercion and the promise of reward is absent. In sum, the presence of the super-ego explains how individuals feel required to act against their own self-interest. This ‘something’ that is over and above our self-interest is the demands of the external morality. Individuals become the agents of the external morality. The super-ego both acts on and transcends the self.

IV

According to Bentham the Panopticon is nothing but a “simple idea in Architecture.”⁵ The Panopticon is a prison. It is an annular building with an inspection tower in the centre. This tower is complete with windows that open onto the inner side of the surrounding building ensuring visibility from all angles. The annular building is divided into cells with two windows, each cell stretching the width of the building. On the inside, the window corresponds to the windows of the tower. The window on the other side faces out and allows light to shine through the cell from end to end. In each cell would be placed a prisoner and in the central tower a watchman⁶. Due to the fact that the cells are back lit it is possible to observe the prisoners at all times.

As Foucault notes, the cells and prisoners are, respectively, “. . . like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 200). The Panopticon is much more than a “simple idea in architecture.” Bentham himself conceived of the Panopticon as an artificial body possessed of life, where the “lodge” would be the animating “heart” of the artificial body (see Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, p. 109). The Panoptic structure is a mechanism whereby cells are arranged so as to allow for constant visibility and immediate recognition of transgressions by inmates, and it is this visibility, as Foucault reminds us, that is the prisoners’ trap. Inmates are

⁵ All references to Bentham’s Panopticon are to the collection entitled *The Panopticon Writings*, edited and introduced by Miran Bozovic, Verso, 1995.

⁶ It need not be a prisoner in the cells. Bentham was so enthusiastic about the efficiency of the Panopticon as a structure he insists that it could be applied to any institution, be it a school, factory, prison or a madhouse. Bentham himself had hoped to be the inspector at the centre of the Panopticon.

securely enclosed in their cell; they are seen but never see. It is precisely this apparent omnipresence and omniscience that sustains discipline in the Panoptic structure, deterring the inmates from transgressing. Deterrence is a function of the omnipresence and omniscience of the “all seeing eye.” The prisoners in the Panopticon are in fact deterred from transgressing by the fiction of God. It is this fiction that maintains the Panoptic universe.

The fiction of God is created in the Panopticon by, as Bozovic has it, a “gaze and a voice” (see Bozovic, p. 11). Both of these factors are cited by Bentham. He says:

I will single out one of the most untoward of the prisoners. I will keep an unintermitted watch upon him. I will watch until I observe a transgression. I will minute it down. I will wait for another: I will note that down too. I will lie by for a whole day: he shall do as he pleases that day, so long as he does not venture at something too serious to be endured. The next day I produce the list to him. – *You thought yourself undiscovered: you abused my indulgence: see how you were mistaken. Another time, you may have rope for two days, ten days: the longer it is, the heavier it will fall upon you. Learn from this, all of you, that in this house transgression never can be safe* (Bentham, p105).

The point of such measures is to prevent transgressing by prisoners. The prisoners begin to watch themselves, monitor their own transgressions and intentions to transgress. Prisoners will believe that the inspector is watching them, discipline becomes internalised, and the inspector becomes superfluous. The impression of the inspector’s omnipresence and of constant surveillance is produced in the prisoner’s mind by such measures. In the Panopticon “the inspector’s back is never turned.”

The effect of the Panopticon is to produce in the prisoner a sense that they are under constant scrutiny and visibility that assures the functioning of discipline, or as Foucault would have it, power. The Panopticon is a mechanism whereby discipline becomes internalised and in doing so, the discipline internalised becomes abstracted from individual examples or commands of the overseer. By taking the external forces into himself, the prisoner “. . . becomes the principle of his own subjection”

(Foucault, p. 203). And the Panopticon is a generalisable model that, as Foucault reminds us, is a way of conceiving of the functioning of power in everyday life.

V

Our claim is that there is a structural parallel between the super-ego and the Panopticon. We have seen that both Freud and Bentham held theories that incorporated a theory of human nature. We have claimed that despite this both thinkers retained a view of “man” as malleable. This malleability consists in the fact that an individual human subject can be manipulated. In Freud’s theory this manipulation consisted in the necessary installation of a super-ego and thus external morality into the psyche. In Bentham’s theory it amounts to the same thing, that is, the installation of external morality. The prisoners in Bentham’s prison would presumably be either not in possession of a super-ego (as they are convicted criminals and thus transgressors of morality) or, which is much more likely, given the Freudian insistence on the general necessity of the super-ego for the existence of civilization, would be in possession of an ineffectual super-ego. As was seen above the aim of the Panopticon is the internalisation of discipline. This particular kind of discipline is punitive.

Now, the concept of this kind of discipline on its own makes no sense. This kind of discipline has to be discipline in light of something, that is, one is disciplined in regards to a society’s morality. With this kind of discipline one becomes capable of restraining from performing acts that are counter to the constraints of morality. The prisoners become capable of acting over and above their own self-interest. It is the case, then, that the result of placing an individual human subject into the Panopticon and subjecting them to the measures outlined by Bentham would result in either the creation of a super-ego in their psyche or the strengthening of an already present but weak one. The aim of the Panopticon is to turn the prisoners into “self-disciplining” subjects.

Self-discipline is precisely what is enabled in a human subject by the super-ego. For Freud the formation and character of the super-ego was equivalent to the formation and character of morality. It is apparent that the operation of the Panopticon is intended to internalise the external morality. Thus for Bentham, the

operation of the Panopticon is equivalent to the formation of a moral sense in a prisoner. Strikingly, for Freud, being in possession of a super-ego was one and the same as being in possession of a moral sense. This is the first parallel between the two thinkers. The aim of the Panopticon is, as was the case with the super-ego, to normalize not just the behaviour of the subject but also the very intentions of the subject. In the Panopticon the presence of the guard is no longer needed as discipline has become internalised and in both cases the promise of reward by acting in accordance with these internalised commands is absent.

Both Freud's and Bentham's theories offer us the mechanism whereby external "forces" are internalised. This mechanism is generalizable across societies and institutions. In both cases the content is unspecific. An individual in different societies or in different institutions (for example a hospital or a school instead of a prison) may be trained differently and thus internalise a different set of commands. This is particularly interesting when considering Freud's and Bentham's relationship to the history of moral philosophy. It is fair to say that (as is noted by Church in regard to Freud) both Freud and Bentham replaced the Kantian notions of the "noumenal self" (that is, the "self" that transcends all experience) with the commands of the super-ego and the guard respectively, replacing the commands of the essentially reasoned will.

For both thinkers as for Kant, this agency, be it the super-ego or the guard, issues imperatives that must be accorded with by the empirical ego (Freud) or by the prisoner (Bentham). Both agencies have no motive for mistreating their underlings. This fact is even more striking when we consider that in the Panopticon individual prisoners are in the position that the empirical ego occupies in relation to the super-ego. Both Freud and Bentham offer us moral and psychological doctrines that replace Kant's reasoned will by what are in effect the arbitrary commands of an external morality. Both Freud and Bentham provide us with a model for discipline and morality suitable for the modern era. Both theories are secular but rely on traditional notions from the history of philosophy and theology such as omniscience and omnipotence. The all seeing eye of God has been replaced with the all seeing eye of the super-ego and the guard respectively.

The second of our parallels is between the Panopticon and the psyche (as conceived by Freud). The super-ego is the omniscient eye and causal voice that

operates on the ego. The guard in the Panopticon carries out the same function. He is the eye that watches over the prisoners and the voice that commands them. In metaphorical terms the guard is the super-ego and the prisoners are the “ego” of the Panopticon. Of course there is more than one prisoner in the Panopticon. This however is beside the point since the claim here is that the guard has exactly the same role in the Panopticon as the super-ego has in the individual human psyche. Both are omniscient, voyeuristic and causal. Both are the forces of coercion. Indeed, it is possible to concur with Fromm’s diagnosis that

[t]he whole scheme “superego, ego, id” is a hierarchical structure, which excludes the possibility that the association of free, i.e., nonexploited, human beings can live harmoniously and without the necessity of controlling sinister forces. (Fromm, [2], p. 7)

This is precisely what the Panopticon is. It is a hierarchical structure premised upon the notion that human subjects are in need of punitive discipline and operates on the basis of “controlling sinister forces.”

In a sense we can also problematise Freud’s claim that psychoanalysis discovered that the super-ego dissolved the difference between guilt felt for a wrong act intended and a wrong act carried out. In fact this is the principle by which the internalisation of discipline is realised in the Panopticon. Only by “feeling” this pinch of guilt in regards to an intention to transgress can the panoptic mechanism be said to be efficacious. The prisoner has internalised the external constraints upon him and has thus become the “principle of his own subjection.” Any individual in possession of a super-ego is the “principle of their own subjection.”

VI

There is a philosophical convergence between Freud and Bentham. This convergence can be seen as fourfold. In the first place both thinkers provide us with parallel theories of man. Second, both thinkers hold that man is malleable. Third, both thinkers found upon this conviction and theory a mechanism for the internalisation of external coercion and fourth, both thinkers held that this

internalisation of the external morality was necessary for the maintenance of civilised society.

These mechanisms of internalisation are given by Freud in the concept of the super-ego and by Bentham in his Panopticon. There is thus a structural parallel between the super-ego and the Panopticon. Both are mechanisms whereby individual's become the "principle of their own subjection."

Coda: From panopticism and the super-ego to Marx

What I have presented in this paper is a description and comparison of aspects of Freud's and Bentham's positions that give us an indication of how an agent may become the "principle of their own subjection." I have presented this comparison without attempting to give even a semi-blown Marxist analysis of these positions. However, it is my view that such a critique would be fruitful and to that extent the analysis presented above may serve as a prompt to this.

Particularly, the central conclusion of this analysis that there is a fourfold convergence between Freud and Bentham will provide four categories from which to set out and to develop such a Marxian critique of both figure's concepts. Firstly, the theories of 'man' presented by both thinkers should be placed in relation to Marxian accounts of "human nature" and to Marx's early account of species being. Not only would this relate this present critique to Marxian thought it may also shed light on Marx's own relationship to Enlightenment thinking, as both Freud and Bentham stand somewhat in this tradition. Secondly, the view that humanity is essentially malleable should be placed in a critical relation to Marx's overall theory. Not only would this provide further insight into species being and to the issue of essentialism in Marx's thought; it would also serve as a critical point of departure for accounts of exploitation and alienation. If human beings are essentially malleable, then from what could they be alienated? Further, because of the context of our discussion, these renewed Marxian accounts will have to take into account the built environment and the role it plays in inducing subjection and the internalisation of "sinister controlling forces." In this context, the relationship between the Panopticon and the Factory, Prison and School would be an interesting point of departure. Such an account may connect with

Marxist geographies more generally and would provide an interesting counterpoint to Foucault.

Thirdly, the mechanisms provided by Freud and Bentham for the internalization of external coercion have to be scrutinized in terms that relate them to, in the first instance, accounts of alienation, and in the second instance, to the possibility of emancipation. If Freud and Bentham leave us with anything in this context it is the suggestion that such internalization is unavoidable and this raises a significant question for Marxian thinkers to address, not least in terms of the early Marx's account of species being and the true nature of the human animal, but also for the general Marxian desire that the "whole man" be realized in a non-exploitative context. If external constraints are unavoidably internalized by such mechanisms as suggested by Freud and Bentham, then this places in question the possibility that such non-exploitative contexts could be achieved in principle.

Fourthly, relating the discussion of internalization to that of civilised society poses deep questions for Marxism. As with the previous case, internalization may be unavoidable. Nevertheless, an analysis of the notion of internalization in terms of how it relates to the notion of civilised society in Freud and Bentham that then relates this discussion to the broader Enlightenment idea of "civil society" as it is developed in Locke and Rousseau would allow for this idea to be, first, juxtaposed to the Hegelian notion of the term from which the Marxian notion derives and, second, to be related to an interpretation and critique of the notion from the point of view of the early Marx. Such an enterprise could begin from Marx's own critique of Hegel and German idealism.⁷

Although this coda is not comprehensive, I hope that it will be suggestive to those who are interested to take this discussion further.

⁷ See Showstack Sassoon, A. "civil society," in *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Second Edition*, pp. 82-84.

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